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SEXUAL HARASSMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA: WHY
TRADITIONAL COMPANY SEXUAL HARASSMENT POLICIES
ARE NOT ENOUGH AND HOW TO FIX IT
Kristen N. Coletta*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the year 2016, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) received 12,860 complaints of sexual harassment,1 illustrating that
sexual harassment is ever present in our society. Compounding this issue,
the rise of social media use by both individuals2 and businesses,3 and its
undoubted prevalence in our society, raises concerns that sexual harassment
on social media is the workplace sexual harassment issue of the present and
future. Despite increased use of social media for personal and business
purposes, regulators and courts have given little guidance as to how
employers should deal with social media sexual harassment claims.4 Indeed,
case law is especially unclear about when employers will be liable for sexual
harassment between employees that occurs on social media.5
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helpful guidance and support in writing this Comment. I would also like to express my
gratitude to my family and friends, especially my parents, John and Muriel Coletta, for their
unconditional love and support throughout this process.
1
Charges Alleging Sexual Harassment FY 2010 – FY 2015, U.S. EEOC,
https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/statistics/enforcement/sexual_harassment_new.cfm (last visited
Oct. 24, 2017).
2
Andrew Perrin, Social Media Usage: 2005–2015, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Oct. 8, 2015),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2015/10/08/social-networking-usage-2005-2015/ (finding that
sixty-five percent of adults use social media as of 2015, which is “a nearly tenfold jump in
the past decade”).
3
Nora Ganim Barnes & Ava M. Lescault, The 2011 Inc. 500 Social Media Update:
Blogging Declines as Newer Tools Rule, Center for Marketing Research at University of
Massachusetts Dartmouth (Sept. 20, 2016), http://www.umassd.edu/media/umassdartmouth
/cmr/studiesandresearch/2011_Inc500.pdf (finding that while business blogging has declined,
other social media use by businesses on websites like Facebook, Twitter, and LinkedIn
increased between 2008 and 2011).
4
See infra Section III.C.1.
5
Id.
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The first purpose of this Comment is to address the rise of sexual
harassment and clarify when an employer is liable for such conduct. The
second purpose of this Comment is to give employers guidance in creating
effective social media sexual harassment policies in an effort to minimize
social media sexual harassment in the first place and help employers avoid
liability when it does occur. Part II explains what “traditional workplace
harassment” is, discusses early workplace harassment case law, examines
when employers may be held liable for the conduct of employees, and
considers when an employer may be liable for employee conduct outside of
work. Part III focuses on the rise of social media use, discusses its effect in
the workplace, and examines case law where courts consider social media
harassment as evidence in sexual harassment claims. Part IV analogizes
other areas of the law in an effort to help determine when employers may be
liable for social media sexual harassment. Part V argues that company social
media policies and company sexual harassment policies are each insufficient
on their own to combat social media harassment and thus, employers must
enact policies that specifically address such harassment. Part V also provides
policy-drafting guidance so that employers can draft effective antiharassment policies.
II. THE DECLINE IN “TRADITIONAL WORKPLACE SEXUAL HARASSMENT”
“”Throughout this Comment, the term “traditional workplace
harassment” refers to sexual harassment that takes place somewhere other
than the Internet. Sexual harassment can include “unwelcome sexual
advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or physical harassment
of a sexual nature.”6 The harasser and the victim can be either male or female
and the conduct need not necessarily be sexual in nature.7 For example,
“offensive remarks about a person’s sex” can result in a sexual harassment
claim.8 Unlawful sexual harassment does not include minor teasing, isolated
minor incidents, or offhand comments; rather, the harassment becomes
illegal “when it is so frequent or severe that it creates a hostile or offensive
work environment or when it results in an adverse employment decision
(such as the victim being fired or demoted).”9 “The harasser can be the
victim’s supervisor, a supervisor in another area, a co-worker, or someone
who is not an employee of the employer, such as a client or customer.”10
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII) makes it an unlawful
6

Sexual Harassment, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/laws/types/sexualharassment.
cfm (last visited Sept. 25, 2016).
7
Id.
8
Id.
9
Id.
10
Id.
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employment practice to discriminate against someone on the basis of “race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.”11 Discriminatory practices under
Title VII include, among other things, harassment on the basis of sex.12
A. Early “Traditional Workplace Harassment” Cases and Title VII
Claims
The District Court for the District of Columbia in Willams v. Saxbe,13
was the first federal court to recognize sexual harassment as unlawful
employment discrimination.14
The issue presented was whether a
supervisor’s retaliatory action based on an employee’s denial of the
supervisor’s sexual advances constitutes unlawful sex discrimination.15
After denying her supervisor’s sexual advances, Diane Williams’ supervisor,
William Saxbe, began humiliating her and treating her poorly.16 He refused
to give her notice of her work obligations, consider her proposals and
recommendations, or recognize her as a competent professional.17 In
addition, he gave her unwarranted reprimands.18 On September 11, 1972,
Saxbe gave Williams notice of his intention to terminate her, and on
September 21, 1972, she was given notice of termination, effective the next
day.19
Taking the facts alleged in the plaintiff’s complaint as true, the court
found that the conduct amounted to unlawful employment discrimination
because there was an “artificial barrier” to employment created for one
gender and not the other, despite both genders being similarly situated.20 The
court rejected the defendant’s argument that discrimination would be
unlawful only if the policy or practice targeted a specific characteristic,
peculiar to one’s gender.21 Instead the court stated, “a rule, regulation,
practice, or policy [ ] applied on the basis of gender is alone sufficient for a
finding of sex discrimination.”22 The court agreed with the Administrative
Hearing Examiner who found the defendant did not meet his burden to show
11

42 U.S.C.A. § 2000e-2(b) (West Year).
Facts About Sexual Harassment, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/publications
/fs-sex.cfm (last visited Oct. 24, 2017).
13
413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976), rev’d on other grounds, Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d
1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
14
Jeremy Gelms, High-Tech Harassment: Employer Liability Under Title VII for
Employee Social Media Misconduct, 87 WASH. L. REV. 249, 252 n.15 (2012).
15
Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 657.
16
Id. at 655–56.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 655.
20
Id. at 657–58.
21
Williams, 413 F. Supp. at 658.
22
Id. (citing Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971)).
12
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that the harassment was unconnected to the termination.23 It was therefore
reasonable to infer that the termination was not due to the employee’s poor
performance, but was instead a retaliatory act.24
Meritor Savings Bank v. Vinson25 was the first United States Supreme
Court case to recognize workplace sexual harassment as actionable under
Title VII, and the first time the Court recognized a cause of action for sexual
harassment because of a hostile work environment.26 Ms. Vinson, a bank
employee, brought a Title VII claim alleging her supervisor made unwanted
sexual advances towards her.27 In fear of losing her job, she complied with
his sexual demands and had intercourse with him multiple times over the
course of her four years of employment.28 On some occasions, the advances
resulted in rape.29 The bank had no notice of the sexual harassment because
Vinson never utilized the bank’s complaint procedure out of fear of losing
her job.30
The employer claimed it was not liable because Title VII prohibits
discrimination claims with respect to “compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges” of employment and the statute therefore allows recovery only
when there is “tangible loss” of an “economic character.”31 The Court
rejected this argument and noted that in Title VII, “[t]he phrase ‘terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment’ evinces a Congressional intent ‘to
strike at the entire spectrum of disparate treatment of men and women’ in
employment.”32 Accordingly, the Court concluded that Title VII claims are
not limited to claims resulting in economic injury (“quid pro quo” claims),
but can also include harassment that results in a hostile or abusive work
environment (“hostile environment” claims).33 The Court further explained
that for sexual harassment to be actionable, the harassment must be “severe
or pervasive” under the totality of the circumstances so as “to alter the
conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working
environment.”34 This is the current standard for Title VII claims.35
23
24
25
26

Id. at 662.
Id. at 656.
477 U.S. 57 (1986).
Brief for Petitioner, Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-

1979).
27

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 60.
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
Id. at 64.
32
Id. (citing L.A. Dept. of Water and Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 707 n.13 (1978)).
33
Meritor, 477 U.S. at 65–66.
34
Id. at 67 (citing Henson v. Dundee, 682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
35
See generally Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (reaffirming the
Meritor standard, which has not since been overruled).
28
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The Court has declined to definitively decide the issue of employer
liability in cases where the employer is not on notice of conduct.36
Nonetheless, the Court rejected the lower court’s finding that employers are
automatically liable for harassment carried out by their supervisor
employees, based on inferred Congressional intent to place some limits on
employer liability.37 At the same time, the Court noted that the existence of
a policy, and the employee’s failure to utilize the policy, does not necessarily
exempt the employer from liability.38
Thereafter, in Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc.,39 the Supreme Court
established a standard for evaluating what type of conduct may be viewed as
unlawful harassment.40 The claim in Harris involved sexual harassment
carried out by the president of the defendant company, Forklift Systems,
against a female manager, Ms. Harris.41 In reversing the decision of the
District Court of Tennessee, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals for
the Sixth Circuit, the Supreme Court reaffirmed the Meritor standard that
actionable harassment under Title VII must be “severe or pervasive” under
the totality of the circumstances, and that severity and pervasiveness have
both objective and subjective elements.42 The Court found that the lower
court erred in looking to whether the sexual harassment affected Harris’s
psychological well-being or whether it led her to suffer injury.43 Writing for
the majority, Justice O’Connor reasoned that “Title VII comes into play
before the harassing conduct leads to a nervous breakdown” and, therefore,
the Meritor standard does not have a psychological harm requirement.44
B. When is an Employer Liable for Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace?
Whether an employer will be liable for a hostile work environmentor
any unlawful harassmentperpetrated by one of its employees depends first
on whether that employee is the victim’s supervisor or co-worker.45 Two

36

Meritor, 477 U.S. at 72.
Id.
38
Id.
39
510 U.S. 17 (1993).
40
See id. at 21–22.
41
Id. at 19.
42
Id. at 21.
43
Id. at 22.
44
Id. (stating that conduct violates Title VII if it is “so severe or pervasive that it create[s]
a work environment abusive to employees because of their race, gender, religion, or national
origin”).
45
Enforcement Guidance on Vicarious Employer Liability for Unlawful Sexual
Harassment by Supervisors, U.S. EEOC, https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.html
#_ftn10 (last visited Oct. 24, 2017) [hereinafter “Enforcement Guidance”].
37
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landmark Supreme Court cases decided on the same day,46 Burlington
Industries, Inc. v. Ellerth47 and Faragher v. City of Boca Raton,48 established
that employers are subject to vicarious liability for unlawful harassment by
their supervisors.49 The Court’s holding in each case is based on two
principles: first, that an employer is responsible for the acts of its supervisors
based on agency principles, and second, that Congress enacted Title VII to
motivate employers to create anti-harassment policies and to encourage
employees to avoid or limit the harm from harassment.50
Under Faragher/Ellerth, an employer is strictly liable for sexual
harassment by a supervisor towards an employee if the supervisor created a
hostile work environment for the employee (by sexually harassing him/her)
and took a tangible employment action (TEA)51 against the employee.52 A
TEA is an action that “constitutes a significant change in employment status,
such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly
different responsibilities, or a significant change in benefits.”53 If the alleged
harasser did not take a TEA, the employer may raise an affirmative defense
by establishing that (a) it exercised reasonable care to prevent and promptly
correct any sexually harassing behavior, and (b) the victim unreasonably
failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities or to
avoid harm otherwise.54
46

Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 764 (1998).
Id. at 765 (holding that, “[a]n employer is subject to vicarious liability to a victimized
employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or
successively higher) authority over the employee,” if the harassment results in the supervisor
materially changing the victim’s employment position (i.e. taking “tangible employment
action”)). The employer can raise an affirmative defense to liability, but only if the
harassment does not result in tangible employment action. See id. The defense must be
proven by a preponderance of the evidence and “comprises two necessary elements: (a) that
the employer exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly any sexually
harassing behavior, and (b) that the plaintiff employee unreasonably failed to take advantage
of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm
otherwise.” Id.
48
524 U.S. 775, 777 (1998) (same holding as Ellerth).
49
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 764; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 777; see also Enforcement Guidance,
supra note 45.
50
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45.
51
Note that a TEA is similar to an adverse employment action, but is a term of art used
specifically in sexual harassment law. TEA is defined above.
52
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 760–61; see also Watson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., No. 01 C
1517, 2003 WL 21799965, at *7 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 1, 2003) (“[I]f Watson is able to demonstrate
that [the alleged harasser] created an actionable hostile environment and took tangible
employment actions against her, she establishes that Home Depot is vicariously liable for [the
alleged harasser’s] actions and the inquiry is at an end.”).
53
Ellerth, 524 U.S. at 761.
54
Id. at 765; Faragher, 524 U.S. at 807; see also Watson, 2003 WL 21799965, at *7
(stating that “[i]f . . . Watson demonstrates that she endured an actionable hostile environment
but fails to establish that [the harasser] took any tangible employment actions against her,
47
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For example, in Watson v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc.,55 the Northern
District of Illinois granted summary judgment in favor of Home Depot
because Watson’s alleged harasser, Terrell, did not take a TEA against her,
and the company also successfully established the Faragher/Ellerth
affirmative defense.56 Among other things, Watson argued that her
termination for exceeding her medical leave was a TEA.57 The court,
however, correctly held that the harassing supervisor must carry out the TEA
for a successful sexual harassment claim.58 At the time of her termination,
Terrell was already transferred to, and working in, another store.59 Thus, he
could not have been responsible for her termination.60
The court next found that Home Depot successfully met each prong of
the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense test. Home Depot satisfied the first
prong because it had an in depth anti-harassment policy and grievance
mechanism; the company satisfied the second prong because it illustrated
that despite its anti-harassment policy and grievance procedure, Watson still
unreasonably failed to report the harassment when it occurred.61
In contrast to a supervisor harassment claim, if the harassment
perpetrator is the victim’s co-worker, the employer cannot raise the
Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense and is liable only if it knew or should
have known of the misconduct, and did not take immediate and appropriate
action to correct it.62 In a case of co-worker harassment, an employer cannot
claim lack of knowledge of the harassment as a defense if there is evidence
that the employer did not clearly inform its employees of its complaint
procedures.63

Home Depot may raise the affirmative defense”).
55
2003 WL 21799965, No. 01 C 1517 (N.D. Ill. August 1, 2003).
56
Id. at *10.
57
Id. at *7.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id.
61
Watson, 2003 WL 21799965, at *9–10.
62
29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(d) (1985); see, e.g., Perry v. Ethan Allen, 115 F.3d 143, 149 (2d
Cir. 1997) (finding that “[w]hen harassment is perpetrated by the plaintiff’s coworkers, an
employer will be liable if the plaintiff demonstrates that the employer either provided no
reasonable avenue for complaint or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it”) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
63
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45, at n.58 (citing Perry, 115 F.3d at 149 (“When
harassment is perpetrated by the plaintiff’s coworkers, an employer will be liable if the
plaintiff demonstrates that ‘the employer either provided no reasonable avenue for complaint
or knew of the harassment but did nothing about it.’”)).
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C. Can an Employer Ever be Held Accountable for Conduct Outside
the Workplace?
Before determining whether the employer is liable for conduct outside
the workplace, a court must first determine that unlawful harassment has
occurred.64 In Title VII hostile work environment claims, courts consider
the totality of the circumstances to determine whether a plaintiff has a
claim.65 Generally, the circuit courts consider harassment that occurs outside
the four walls of the workplace when the harassment is severe or pervasive
enough to have consequences at work.66 The First,67 Second,68 Seventh,69
and Eighth70 Circuits have all considered harassment that occurred away
from work in the totality of the circumstances.71
In Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., the First Circuit admitted evidence of
events occurring outside the workplace because the conduct “outside of work
help[ed] explain why she was so frightened of [the harasser] and why his
constant presence around her at work created a hostile work environment.”72
In Ferris v. Delta Airlines, Inc., the Second Circuit found the airline liable
for a rape that happened while flight attendants were in a hotel booked by
the employer for an overnight stay between flights.73 The Ferris court stated
64

Id.
Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 69 (1986); see also 29 C.F.R. §
1604.11(b) (1985) (“In determining whether alleged conduct constitutes sexual harassment,
the Commission will look at the record as a whole and at the totality of the circumstances,
such as the nature of the sexual advances and the context in which the alleged incidents
occurred. The determination of the legality of a particular action will be made from the facts,
on a case by case basis.”).
66
See generally Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409–10 (1st Cir. 2002); Ferris
v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001); Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974,
983 (7th Cir. 2008); Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir.
2011); Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2003); Sprague
v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
67
Crowley, 303 F.3d at 409–10 (admitting evidence in a claim against plaintiff’s
employer for a co-employee’s conduct, including following plaintiff home, encounters in a
bar, and breaking into her home, reasoning that the “non-workplace conduct” was relevant to
illustrate the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment and also explained plaintiff’s fear
of the co-worker).
68
Ferris, 277 F.3d at 135 (finding an airline liable for a rape that happened while flight
attendants were in a hotel booked by the employer for an overnight stay between flights).
69
Lapka, 517 F.3d at 983 (finding that “harassment does not have to take place within
the physical confines of the workplace to be actionable; it need only have consequences in
the workplace”); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 715 (7th Cir. 2006) (same).
70
Dowd, 253 F.3d at 1101–02 (finding that “[t]he touchstone for a Title VII hostile work
environment claim is whether the workplace is permeated with discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule and insult that is sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment”) (internal quotations omitted).
71
See Gelms, supra note 14, at 260–62.
72
Crowley, 303 F.3d at 409–10.
73
Ferris, 277 F.3d at 135.
65
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that while the rape was considered to have occurred in a work environment
within the meaning of Title VII due to the special circumstances, it was a
close call.74 The court implied that other claims that are more disconnected
from the workplace may not be considered the same way.75
In Lapka v. Chertoff, the Seventh Circuit admitted evidence of
harassing events outside the workplace by merely stating that “harassment
does not have to take place within the physical confines of the workplace to
be actionable; it need only have consequences in the workplace.”76 Finally,
in Dowd v. United Steelworkers of America, the Eighth Circuit admitted
evidence of harassing events outside the workplace because the events
happened in close proximity to the workplace (outside the building on the
workers’ drive in).77 The court reasoned that the harassment was arguably
“perpetrated with the intention to intimidate and to affect the working
atmosphere inside the plant,” and, therefore, a reasonable jury could find that
the events contributed to creating a hostile work environment.78
On the other hand, the Fifth79 and Tenth80 Circuits have come close to
finding conduct outside the workplace was “sufficiently pervasive or severe
to alter the conditions of employment and create an abusive working
environment,”81 but have not yet had a case with facts to support this
conclusion. In Gowesky v. Singing River Hospital, the Fifth Circuit reasoned
that because Gowesky never came back to work after being on disability, the
alleged harassment that occurred over the phone could not have had
consequences in the workplace.82 In Sprague v. Thorn Americas, the Tenth
Circuit reasoned that the most severe instance of sexual harassment would
not be considered because it occurred at a wedding, not in the workplace,
and the other alleged harassment occurred sporadically over sixteen
months.83 Therefore, the conduct taken together was not sufficiently severe

74

Id.
Id.
76
Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2008).
77
Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2011).
78
Id.
79
Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2003) (refusing
to extend the workplace beyond the four walls because all of the alleged conduct happened
over the phone or in writing while plaintiff was on disability leave and she never returned to
work).
80
Sprague v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997) (refusing to
consider most severe incident of sexual harassment in a series of events over sixteen months
because it took place at a wedding reception and not at work).
81
Gowesky, 321 F.3d at 509 (internal quotations omitted); see also Gelms, supra note
14, at 263.
82
Gowesky, 321 F.3d at 510–11.
83
Sprague, 129 F.3d at 1366.
75
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or pervasive enough to have consequences in the workplace.84
While the circuits may apply a similar test and admit evidence of sexual
harassment on social media if it creates effects in the workplace, the answer
is unclear. The courts have not given much, if any, thought to the issue thus
far.
III. THE EVOLUTION OF SOCIAL MEDIA IN THE WORKPLACE
A. Background About Social Media’s Effect in the Workplace
Social media is a broad term that encompasses many different types of
communication tools, including collaborative projects, blogs, content
communities, social networking sites, virtual game worlds, and virtual social
worlds.85 Among the various forms of social media, social networking sites
have become the most popular forum for sexual harassment and have been
defined by social scientists as “web-based services that allow individuals to
(1) construct a public or semi-public profile within a bounded system, (2)
articulate a list of other users with whom they share a connection, and (3)
view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others within
the system.”86 Social networking sites have become a main source of
Internet communication in recent years. Thus, many of the Internet
communications that result in sexual harassment have occurred on social
networking sites (“social media” for the purposes of this paper) and have
resulted in increased potential for employer liability for their employees’
actions on these sites.87 Businesses are also incorporating the social media
world into the workplace by creating business-related social media accounts
and websites for their businesses.88

84

Id.
Gelms, supra note 14, at 264–65.
86
Id. at 265 (citing Danah M. Boyd & Nicole B. Ellison, Social Network Sites:
Definition, History, and Scholarship, 13 J. COMPUTER-MEDIATED COMM. 210, 210–11
(2007)).
87
Alison Cain & Katherine O’Brien, Facebook Status Update: Employer is. . .Sued:
How Internet Harassment Could Lead to a Change in Status, LEEDS BROWN LAW P.C.,
http://www.lmblaw.com/media/in-the-news/articles/internet-harassment/ (last visited Oct.
19, 2016) (stating that, “[a]s a result of the proliferation of communication platforms the
potential for employer liability is increasing for the actions of their employees, even when
distinctly outside of the workplace”).
88
Nick Clayton, Business Joins the Party, WALL ST. J. (May 4, 2011, 12:01 AM),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703712504576244622146113118; see also
Cain & O’Brien, supra note 87 (stating that as early as May 2006, the social networking site,
Facebook.com, had over 1,000 work networks).
85
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A recent Pew Research Center study found that employees, both fulltime and part-time, regularly use social media at work.89 The study found
that of their 2,003 person sample size, 34% use social media while at work
to take a mental break; 27% use it to connect with friends and family outside
while at work; 24% use it to make or support professional connections; 20%
use it to get information that helps them solve work problems; 17% use it to
build or strengthen personal relationships with coworkers; 17% use it to learn
about someone they work with; 12% use it to ask work-related questions to
someone outside their organization; and 12% use it to ask those questions to
people within their organization.90 These numbers illustrate the proliferation
of social media, and thus, the obvious effect that its existence and use has on
the workplace.
B. The Rise of Social Media Workplace Harassment
There is currently no data on the rate of social media workplace sexual
harassment over time. There is, however, abundant evidence that social
media use is on the rise, and that social media harassment is indeed a
significant issue.91 The Pew Research Center has found that, as of 2015,
65% of American adults use at least one social networking site.92 This
number steadily increased from 46% in 2010.93 Similarly, online harassment
has proven to be a significant problem, with 40% of Internet users being
victims of varying degrees of online harassment as of 2014.94 While there is
no data on the rate of social media harassment over time, one can logically
infer a rise in online workplace harassment from the increase in social media
use and the high percentage of online harassment experienced by Internet
users.
The rise of social media use in the employment realm creates more
portals for employees to communicate with each otherinevitably resulting
in more communication, and thus, more harassment.95 An article in TIME
89

Nicole B. Ellison, Cliff Lampe, & Kenneth Olmstead, Social Media and the
Workplace, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 22, 2016), http://www.pewinternet.org/2016/06/22
/social-media-and-the-workplace/.
90
See id. Note that data does not add up to 100% because some participants fell into
more than one category.
91
See id; see also Perrin, supra note 2 (finding that 65% of adults now use social
networking sites); see also, Maeve Duggan, Online Harassment, PEW RESEARCH CENTER
(Oct. 22, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/2014/10/22/online-harassment/ (finding that
73% of adults have seen someone be harassed on the Internet, and about 40% have
experienced Internet harassment themselves).
92
Perrin, supra note 2.
93
Id.
94
Duggan, supra note 91.
95
See generally Ellison, Lampe & Olmstead, supra note 89; see also Duggan, supra note
91.
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magazine about Internet “trolling” explains that the Internet was once simply
a portal for the free flow of information, but has now turned into a portal for
hatred.96 “Trolls” are “people who relish in online freedom” at the expense
of others.97 Joel Stein, the author of the aforementioned TIME article,
explained that psychologists attribute the rise of Internet hatred to “‘the
online disinhibition effect,’ in which factors like anonymity, invisibility, a
lack of authority, and not communicating in real time strip away the mores
society spent millennia building.”98
Though “trolling” (as used in the article) is not analogous to social
media sexual harassment in the workplace, comparisons can be drawn.
While anonymity may not translate to social media sexual harassment
connected to the workplace, a lack of communicating in real time probably
does. It is much easier to sexually harass a coworker if you do not have to
do it to his or her face. As quoted directly from an online “troll” herself,
“[t]he Internet is the realm of the coward.”99 Furthermore, employees may
be under the false assumption that there are less or no consequences of social
media harassment because it is less directly connected to the workplace.100
As a result, employees may view the Internet as a safe space to carry out the
harassment that is prohibited at work.
C. How Social Media Harassment Changes Employer Liability
As discussed above, in traditional workplace harassment claims,
employers are liable for almost all harassment carried out by their
supervisory employees, and they are liable for co-worker harassment if the
employer had reason to know of the misconduct and failed to take immediate
and appropriate action to remedy it.101 Even if harassment occurs outside of
the four walls of the workplace, the employer will usually be liable if the
harassment has some connection to the workplace.102 Harassment with a
connection to the workplace includes for example, if a woman is harassed at
a work-sponsored happy hour or if her supervisor follows her home from

96

Joel Stein, Tyranny of the Mob, TIME MAG., Aug. 2016, at 27.
Id.
98
Id.
99
Id. at 32 (quoting a “troll” who has made the author of this article, Stein, her target in
the online trolling world).
100
Ena T. Diaz, Social Media: A Growing Concern for Sexual Harassment in the
Workplace, ATT’Y AT LAW MAG., http://www.attorneyatlawmagazine.com/miami/social-med
ia-a-growing-concern-for-sexual-harassment-in-the-workplace-2/ (last visited Sept. 14, 2016)
(explaining that the links between private and work-life have been blurred by the use of social
media, particularly when colleagues are “friends” on Facebook).
101
See supra Part II.A.2.
102
See supra Part II.A.3.
97
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work.103
Employer liability for social media sexual harassment is more difficult
because it is unclear when the use of social media is connected to the
workplace such that the employer should be liable.104 Some scholars have
argued that courts should include evidence of social media harassment in the
totality of the circumstances for Title VII claims when the employer has
derived a “substantial benefit” from the social media source on which the
harassment occurs.105 Whether the employer derived a “substantial benefit”
from the social media depends on “whether the social media was sufficiently
integrated into the employer’s business operations to qualify as a logical
extension of the workplace.”106 If the employer derives a substantial benefit
from the social media, courts can then consider the social media harassment
in the claim.107 This could include harassment through an employer-run
bulletin, an employee’s business social media account, or even an
employee’s personal account used to promote his or her employer or his or
her employer’s products.108
Courts often consider harassment that occurs on social media in Title
VII hostile work environment claims. The case Blakey v. Continental
Airlines,109 concerned a pattern of sexual harassment in the workplace and
continuing harassment through defamatory and gender-based statements
made on an electronic bulletin board used by employees of Continental
Airlines.110 Continental employees were required to use the forum to access
their flight schedules and assignments.111 Continental argued that (1) it did
not have a duty to remedy the situation because operation of the online
bulletin was outsourced to another company, and (2) since the Internet
cannot be considered “in the workplace,” it did not have a duty to monitor
the forum.112 The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected this argument and
instead framed the issue as whether “an employer, having actual or
103
Compare Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409–10 (1st Cir. 2002); Ferris v.
Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001); Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983
(7th Cir. 2008); Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1102 (8th Cir. 2011),
with Gowesky v. Singing River Hosp. Sys., 321 F.3d 503, 510–11 (5th Cir. 2003); Sprague
v. Thorn Ams., Inc., 129 F.3d 1355, 1366 (10th Cir. 1997).
104
See generally, Gelms, supra note 14 (exploring the question of when harassment that
occurs on social media should be included in the “totality of the circumstances” for a Title
VII sexual harassment claim).
105
Id. at 251.
106
Id. at 273.
107
Id.
108
Id.
109
751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000).
110
Id. at 542–43.
111
Id. at 544.
112
Id. at 545.
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constructive knowledge that co-employees are posting harassing, retaliatory,
and sometimes defamatory, messages about a co-employee on a bulletin
board used by the company’s employees, [has] a duty to prevent the
continuation of such harassing conduct[.]”113
The court explained that if the online forum harassment had happened
in an employee lounge, there would be little doubt that it would be
“sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of employment and
to create an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment.”114 The
pivotal question then became whether an online electronic bulletin board was
equivalent to a bulletin board in a pilot’s lounge or a work-related place.115
The court reasoned, severe or pervasive harassment in a work-related setting
which creates a pattern of harassment in the workplace “is sufficiently
related to the workplace that an informed employer who takes no effective
measures to stop it, ‘sends the harassed employee the message that the
harassment is acceptable and that the management supports the harasser.’”116
Blakey lays out a standard for employer liability that aligns with federal
law.117 The finding that a workplace harassment claim can arise from
harassment on a work-related online bulletin board illustrates that courts are
not hesitant to expand the workplace to the Internet, especially when the
conduct creates hostility within the four walls of the workplace.118
In Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Services, Inc.,119 Amira-Jabbar, a black
female, brought a hostile work environment claim against her former
employer after a co-worker posted a photo of her at a work-related event on
his personal Facebook page.120 Another co-worker posted a comment that
the plaintiff claimed was racially motivated harassment. The plaintiff’s
complaint cited this incident, as well as other incidents of harassment in the
workplace.121
The Puerto Rico District Court found that the social media incident was
relevant enough to be considered in the totality of the circumstances because
it was sufficiently work-related,122 but failed to explain the reasoning behind
113

Id. at 542.
Id. at 548–49. (citing Lehmann v. Toys ‘R’ Us, Inc., 626 A.2d 445, 448 (N.J. 1993)).
115
Blakey, 751 A.2d at 549.
116
Id. at 550 (citing Lehmann, 626 A.2d at 463).
117
See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (establishing that
conduct violates Title VII if it is so “severe or pervasive” as “to alter the conditions of [the
victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment”); see also Harris v.
Forklift Sys., Inc. 510 U.S. 17, 21 (1993) (reaffirming the Meritor standard).
118
Blakey, 751 A.2d at 550.
119
726 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.P.R. 2010).
120
Id. at 81.
121
Id.
122
Id. at 85–86.
114
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this determination.123 Despite this finding, the court dismissed AmiraJabbar’s claim because the few incidents that occurred were “‘offhand
comments’ or ‘isolated incidents’ that [were] insufficient to create an abusive
environment.”124 The court also found that the remedial action taken by the
employer when the sexual harassment was brought to its attention satisfied
the “prompt and appropriate action” standard, and the employer was
therefore not liable.125 This action included both an investigation and a
review of the company’s harassment policies with all of its employees.126
Though Amira-Jabbar did not deal with sexual harassment, the EEOC
takes the position that the same basic standards apply in all types of
harassment cases.127 As in Amira-Jabbar, employers must take “prompt and
appropriate action” when notified of harassment to avoid liability for the
actions of their employees.128 That action must include a review of company
harassment policies. In the days of advanced technology and widespread use
of social media, harassment policies specific to social media are crucial to
both informing employees of the legality of their actions and reducing
employer liability for those actions.
IV. USING OTHER AREAS OF LAW TO PIN DOWN EMPLOYER LIABILITY
AND POLICY-DRAFTING NECESSITIES
A. Can Employers Be Held Liable for Sexual Harassment Under the
NLRA?
Since workplace sexual harassment claims fall under Title VII, there is
no specific provision of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA or the Act)
dealing with sexual harassment in the workplace.129 While the NLRA does
not address sexual harassment, and so the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or the Board) does not regulate sexual harassment, it is still well
123

Gelms, supra note 14, at 271.
Amira-Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 85–86.
125
Id. at 86.
126
Id. at 87.
127
Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45; see also 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1985) (“The
principles involved here continue to apply to race, color, religion or national origin.”); EEOC
Compliance
Manual
Section
615.11(a)
(BNA
615:0025),
https://www.eeoc.gov/policy/docs/harassment.pdf (“Title VII law and agency principles will
guide the determination of whether an employer is liable for age harassment by its supervisors,
employees, or non-employees.”).
128
Amira-Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d at 87; see also Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45
(stating that an employer will be liable for harassment from a co-worker unless it can show
that it took “immediate and appropriate corrective action” upon employee complaint).
129
Jerome B. Kauff & Laura L. Putney, Sexual Harassment Within the Context of the
National Labor Relations Act, KAUFF MCGUIRE & MARGOLIS, LLP, http://www.kmm
.com/articles-9.html#anchor292162 (last visited Oct. 17, 2016).
124
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within the jurisdiction of the NLRB to determine whether company policies
adequately balance employer interests with employee rights under the
NLRA.130 Thus, the NLRB’s position on social media policies provides
important guidance on drafting an effective social media sexual harassment
policy.
B. The NLRB’s Minimal Drafting Guidance on Social Media
While the NLRB does not regulate sexual harassment, it “has taken a
strong stance in favor of privacy,”131 in terms of social media policies. This
strong stance makes it clear that company social media policies cannot
violate employees’ section 7 rights under the NLRA to engage in “concerted
activity”132 and cannot violate section 8(a)(1) by interfering, restraining, or
coercing employees in the exercise of rights guaranteed by section 7.133
Section 7 allows employees to “engage in concerted activity for collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection.”134 The NLRB gives the
following guidance on defining concerted activity:
Activity is “concerted” if it is engaged in with or on the authority
of other employees, not solely by and on behalf of the employee
himself. It includes circumstances where a single employee seeks
to initiate, induce, or prepare for group action, as well as where an
employee brings a group complaint to the attention of
management. Activity is “protected” if it concerns employees’
interests as employees.135
A company’s social media policy violates section 8(a)(1) where the
policy reasonably tends to “chill employees in the exercise of their [s]ection

130
See generally Belinda R. Gross, Section 7 of the NLRA, AM. BAR ASS’N, YOUNG
LAWYERS DIV., http://www.americanbar.org/groups/young_lawyers/publications/the_101_
201_practice_series/section _7_of_the_NLRA.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2016).
131
Symposium, Sexual Harassment Versus Workplace Romance: Social Media Spillover
and Textual Harassment in the Workplace, 27 ACAD. OF MGMT. PERSPECTIVES 187, 195
(2013).
132
The NLRB and Social Media, NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/news-outreach/factsheets/nlrb-and-social-media (last visited Oct. 27, 2016) (describing memos from the NLRB’s
General Counsel which advised employers on whether to act on questionable employee social
media activity and advised not to act in situations where the employees were engaging in
“protected concerted activity”).
133
Gross, supra note 130; see also 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (2012).
134
29 U.S.C. § 157 (2012); Joseph Domenick Guarino, Drafting Advice: Developing
Social Media Policies, LEXISNEXIS: LEXIS ADVISOR PRACTICE JOURNAL (Nov. 25, 2015),
https://www.lexisnexis.com/lexis-practice-advisor/the-journal/b/lpa/archive/2015/11/25/dra
fting-advice-developing-social-media-policies.aspx.
135
Interfering with Employee Rights (Section 7 & 8(a)(1)), NLRB, https://www.nlrb.gov/
rights-we-protect/whats-law/employers/interfering-employee-rights-section-7-8a1
(last
visited Oct. 27, 2016).
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7 rights.”136 In regards to employee social media use outside the workplace,
the Board has held that employees will be protected under sections 7 and
8(a)(1) when activity online (even activity disparaging the employer)
discusses wages, hours, union membership, and anything else that could
reasonably be considered “concerted activity” or is for the “mutual aid or
protection” of other employees.137 The Board has even found that an
individual’s activity may be “concerted” if he acts on his own, “but in a way
that may benefit the group.”138 Protecting employees’ section 7 rights is
important for regulating sexual harassment policies as well.139 The same
rules protecting concerted activity between employees also apply to
company sexual harassment policies.140
While concerted activity protection is not relevant for social media
sexual harassment, the Board’s guidance on social media policies creates the
presumption that the Board views social media as connected to the
workplace and that its social media regulations naturally extend to this area
of the law. Unfortunately, this recognition still does not help determine when
employers will be liable for social media sexual harassment.
C. A Useful Comparison—School District Liability for CyberBullying
While the NLRB’s guidance does not help determine employer
liability, an analogy to school district liability for cyber-bullying may prove
useful in getting to that determination. While social media sexual harassment
jurisprudence began moving towards the possibility of utilizing a
“substantial benefits” test,141 cyber-bullying jurisprudence has moved
towards a different standard—the “substantial disruption” test.142
136

Gross, supra note 130.
Id. (citing Three D, LLC v. NLRB, No. 14-3284, 2015 WL 6161477 (2d Cir. 2015)
(upholding a Board decision finding that employees were wrongly terminated based on
section 7 and section 8(a)(1) for complaining, on Facebook, about their employer’s failure to
withhold the proper amount of payroll taxes).
138
Id. (citing Pier Sixty, LLC, 362 N.L.R.B. 59 (Mar. 31, 2015) (finding that an employee
was wrongly terminated for posting to his personal Facebook page, a “profanity-charged rant”
about disrespectful treatment by an assistant manager). The end of the post at issue in Pier
Sixty read, “Vote Yes for the Union!” 362 N.L.R.B. 59, at *2.
139
See Memorandum from Richard F. Griffin, Jr., General Counsel, Nat’l Labor Relations
Board 10 (Mar. 18, 2015), https://www.aaup.org/sites/default/files/NLRB%20Handbook%
20Guidance.pdf.
140
See id. (stating that “anti-harassment rules cannot be so broad that employees would
reasonably read them as prohibiting vigorous debate or intemperate comments regarding
Section 7-protected subjects”).
141
Gelms, supra note 14, at 251.
142
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 571–72 (4th Cir. 2011) (quoting Tinker
v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist. 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)) (quotations and alterations
omitted) (holding that a school can discipline student speech when it “disrupts
137
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In Kowalski v. Berkeley County Schools,143 the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals adopted the “substantial disruption” test for determining when a
school district can legally discipline a student for cyber-bullying outside of
school hours.144 The case involved a high school senior, Kara Kowalski,
who created a Myspace.com page that targeted a fellow classmate, Shay
N.145 After Kowalski invited about one hundred classmates to follow the
page, Shay found out about the webpage and her parents filed a harassment
complaint with the school.146 Shay did not want to attend classes that day,
noting that she felt very uncomfortable about sitting in class with the students
who commented on the page.147 The school determined that Kowalski
created a “hate website” in violation of the school policy against
“harassment, bullying, and intimidation.”148 After the school punished her,
Kowalski filed a lawsuit against the school system “alleging that the
administration’s decision to punish her for the MySpace web page
constituted a violation of the First Amendment.”149
Adopting the “substantial disruption” test from Tinker v. Des Moines
Independent Community School District,150 the Fourth Circuit held that the
school district was authorized to discipline Kowalski “because regardless of
where her speech originated . . . the speech was materially and substantially
disruptive in that it ‘interfer[ed] . . . with the schools’ [sic] work [and]
colli[ded] with the rights of other students to be secure and to be let
alone.’”151 While the United States Supreme Court has not yet adopted the
“substantial disruption” test for school cyber-bullying, jurisprudence and
scholarship suggest that it is the best, and most effective, test.152
classwork, creates substantial disorder, or collides with or invades the rights of others”).
143
652 F.3d 565.
144
Christopher A. Sickles, Bridging the Liability Gap: How Kowalski’s Interpretation of
Reasonable Foreseeability Limits School Liability for Inaction in Cases of Cyberbullying, 21
WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 241, 242 (2012) (citing Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 567; Tinker, 393
U.S. at 513).
145
Id. at 249.
146
Id. at 250.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Id.
150
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
151
Kowalski v. Berkeley Cty. Sch., 652 F.3d 565, 573–74 (4th Cir. 2011) (citing Tinker,
393 U.S. at 508); see also Bell v. Itawamba Cty. Sch. Bd., 799 F.3d 379, 395 (5th Cir. 2015)
(applying the Tinker rule and holding that “conduct by a student, which materially disrupts
classwork or involves substantial disorder or invasion of the rights of others, is not immunized
by the First Amendment, [and] applies when a student intentionally directs at the school
community speech reasonably understood by school officials to threaten, harass, and
intimidate a teacher, even when speech originated off campus”).
152
Sickles, supra note 144, at 259; see also Kowalski, 652 F.3d at 572; Bell, 799 F.3d at
395.
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Imagine applying the substantial disruption test in the sexual
harassment social media realm. Under a substantial disruption test, a
harassing event that occurs on social media—and therefore technically,
outside the workplace—would be considered in the “totality of the
circumstances” analysis when the harassment creates a “substantial
disruption” or has a substantial effect in the workplace. This would achieve
the same goal as the Meritor “severe and pervasive” standard for traditional
workplace sexual harassment. The Meritor test holds an employer liable
only when the sexual harassment is so “severe or pervasive” under the
totality of the circumstances “to alter the conditions of [the victim’s]
employment and create an abusive working environment.”153
Similarly, the “substantial disruption” test would look only to social
media sexual harassment that is so severe and pervasive that the effects spill
over into the workplace (the employer’s unquestionable jurisdiction) and
alter the victim’s terms and conditions of employment. If the harassment
occurring on social media is so severe that it affects the victim’s work life,
then it is so “severe and pervasive” that the employer should know about the
harassment and, therefore, has an obligation to address it. For these same
reasons, the test also aligns with the view adopted by the First,154 Second,155
Seventh,156 and Eighth157 Circuits, as discussed in Section II.A.3.
The “substantial disruption” test is much more practical than the
“substantial benefits” test because the former covers more necessary ground
than the latter. Under the “substantial benefits” test, someone who is
severely harassed by a supervisor or co-worker in an online forum would not
153

Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 67 (1986) (citing Henson v. Dundee,
682 F.2d 897, 904 (11th Cir. 1982)).
154
Crowley v. L.L. Bean, Inc., 303 F.3d 387, 409–10 (1st Cir. 2002) (admitting evidence
in a claim against plaintiff’s employer for a co-employee’s conduct, including following
plaintiff home, encounters in a bar, and breaking into her home, reasoning that the “nonworkplace conduct” was relevant to illustrate the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment
and also to explain plaintiff’s fear of the co-worker).
155
Ferris v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 277 F.3d 128, 135 (2d Cir. 2001) (finding the airline
liable for a rape that happened while flight attendants were in a hotel booked by the employer
for an overnight stay between flights). In Ferris, the court implied that while these events are
considered to have occurred in a work environment within the meaning of Title VII due to the
special circumstances, it was a close call, and other claims that are more disconnected from
the workplace may not be considered the same way. Id.
156
Lapka v. Chertoff, 517 F.3d 974, 983 (7th Cir. 2008) (finding that “harassment does
not have to take place within the physical confines of the workplace to be actionable; it need
only have consequences in the workplace”); Doe v. Oberweis Dairy, 456 F.3d 704, 715 (7th
Cir. 2006) (same).
157
Dowd v. United Steelworkers of Am., 253 F.3d 1093, 1101–02 (8th Cir. 2011) (finding
that “[t]he touchstone for a Title VII hostile work environment claim is whether the workplace
is permeated with discriminatory intimidation, ridicule or insult that is sufficiently severe or
pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s employment and create an abusive working
environment”) (internal quotations omitted).
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have a claim even if the harassment created severe effects in the workplace,
unless that online forum provided a substantial benefit for the employer. The
substantial benefits test is therefore simply far too narrow. In contrast, this
situation would clearly fall within the bounds of the “substantial disruption”
test as long as the harassment creates severe effects in the workplace.
Under the “substantial disruption” test, the scope of employer liability
may extend far beyond the “four walls of the workplace”—it is a broad test.
While this broad test is not ideal for employers, it is the most effective test
offered by both scholarship and jurisprudence to date. A broad scope of
employer liability makes in-depth social media policies that much more
important. Broad liability means that policies must discuss prohibited
conduct within the workplace, as well as conduct that could create employer
liability outside the four walls.
V. HOW TO AVOID EMPLOYER LIABILITY WHEN EMPLOYEES ENGAGE IN
HARASSMENT ON SOCIAL MEDIA
As illustrated by Blakey and Amira-Jabbar, the presence of social
media undoubtedly blurs the line of separation between the workplace and
the online world.158 These cases also show that employees likely do not
realize that the line is so thin or that what they say on online forums can
result in workplace discipline for themselves and civil liability for their
employers.159 Thus, enacting effective policies specifically addressing
sexual harassment that occurs on social media is the logical next step for
companies to not only educate their employees, but also to minimize the
effects of, and liability for, social media harassment.160 The policies that
employers have in place to combat traditional harassment are in most cases
insufficient to deal with harassment that occurs on social media because
these policies do not deal with the question of whether conduct on social
media will be deemed connected to the workplace. General company social
media policies are also insufficient because there is some confusion about
158

See generally Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J. 2000); Amira-Jabbar
v. Travel Servs., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.P.R. 2010).
159
See generally Blakey, 751 A.2d 538; Amira-Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d 77.
160
Kristen Bellstrom, 25 Years After Anita Hill, Have We Made Progress on Sexual
Harassment?, FORTUNE (Apr. 19, 2016, 12:22 PM), http://fortune.com/2016/04/19/anita-hillsexual-harassment-eeoc/ (Jenny Yang, the EEOC Chair, explains that one of the biggest
factors leading to litigation is employers’ failure to communicate their harassment policies);
Amy Blackstone, Fighting Sexual Harassment in the Workplace, SCHOLARS STRATEGY
NETWORK,
http://www.scholarsstrategynetwork.org/brief/fighting-sexual-harassmentworkplace (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) (stating that employers must “spell out clear policies
against harassment and make known the consequences of violations for harassers”); Ellison,
Lampe & Olmstead, supra note 89 (finding that far less employees use social media at work
when their employers have a policy prohibiting it).
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what constitutes a sound company social media policy.161
The social media policy confusion stems from the NLRB’s failure to
give explicit guidelines about what language companies’ social media
policies need to use in order to avoid violating their employees’ rights under
the NLRA.162 Company policies targeting social media activity tend to be
very broad163 for a number of reasons, but a key motivator is the widespread
fear that restricting employees’ social media use will indirectly restrict their
section 7 rights to engage in concerted activity under the NLRA.164 While
the problems with drafting regular social media policies are an interesting
issue, they are beyond the scope of this Comment. The point is that the broad
language used in many company social media policies is not sufficient to
target and minimize sexual harassment.165
Furthermore, scholars have found that workers whose employers have
at-work social media policies are less likely to use social media for personal
reasons while on the job.166 Of those whose employers have social media
policies, 30% use social media to take a mental break from work as opposed
to 40% of those whose employers do not have policies.167 This data
illustrates that at-work policies are effective and allows for the inference that
social media policies specific to sexual harassment will contribute to
minimizing its pervasiveness.
A. Does Creating a Sexual Harassment Social Media Policy Amount
to a Concession That Social Media is Connected to the
Workplace?
Some may argue that creating sexual harassment social media policies
effectively forces the employer to concede that harassment on social media
is connected to the workplace. Unfortunately for employers, there is no

161

Joel S. Barras, Sara A. Begley, Amanda D. Haverstick & Divonne Smoyer, Perils and
Pitfalls: Social Media Law and the Workplace 2, U.S. CHAMBER INST. OF LEGAL REFORM
(2014).
162
Id.
163
See Kevin J. Jones & Lisa A. Mainiero, Sexual Harassment Versus Workplace
Romance: Social Media Spillover and Textual Harassment in the Workplace, 27 ACAD. MGMT
PERSP., 193–94 (2013), http://dx.doi.org/10.5465/amp.2012.0031 (citing many examples of
company social media policies with broad language and a general warning not to discuss
work-related matters online because the lines between personal and professional are often
blurred when social media use is involved).
164
See Michelle Drouin, Kimberly W. O’Connor & Gordon B. Schmidt, Helping Workers
Understand and Follow Social Media Policies, 59 BUS. HORIZONS 205, 208,
www.elsevier.com/locate/bushor (last visited Oct. 22, 2016).
165
See infra Part VI.B.3 for a discussion about drafting sexual harassment social media
policies in such a way so as to avoid violating section 7 rights of employees.
166
Ellison, Lampe & Olmstead, supra note 89.
167
Id.
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denying that an employee’s actions on social media may be connected to the
workplace. The NLRB gives guidelines on social media policies, implying
that social media can be connected to work.168 Employers themselves often
create social media policies as preventative measures, and courts have even
found that social media is connected to the workplace in some cases.169
An employer who creates a social media sexual harassment policy does
not, however, concede that social media harassment is in every instance
connected to the workplace. Policies that aim to inform employees about
what type of conduct a court may find to be connected to the workplace are
simply preventative measures to inform employees about conduct that may
or may not be connected to the workplace.
B. Employers Must Be Aware of When Liability May Arise
Unfortunately, it is unclear when employer liability will arise because
the Circuit Courts of Appeals disagree on the definition of the workplace.170
In traditional claims, whether a court will expand workplace harassment
claims beyond “the four walls of the workplace” will often depend on
whether the conduct has consequences at work.171 But, as the case law
illustrates, it is not clear what type of harassment outside of work courts will
consider or how severe the consequences at work must be. Thus, these
questions are determinable only on a case-by-case basis.
There is a similar lack of certainty for employee conduct online. Blakey
and Amira-Jabbar make clear that there is no bright-line rule to determine
what type of social media forum may be considered.172 Blakey sets forth a
“substantial benefits” test,173 which is also endorsed by some scholars as
described above,174 where an employer will be liable if the forum is
sufficiently related to the workplace, and the employer receives a substantial
benefit from the forum.175 The court in Amira-Jabbar, however, was far less
clear about why a post on a personal Facebook page was sufficiently related
to the workplace so as to create employer liability.176 Thus, while the case
168

See supra Part IV.B.
See supra Part III.C.1.
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See supra Part II.A.3; see also Blakey v. Cont’l Airlines, Inc., 751 A.2d 538 (N.J.
2000); Amira-Jabbar v. Travel Servs., Inc., 726 F. Supp. 2d 77 (D.P.R. 2010).
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See supra Part II.A.3.
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See generally Blakey, 751 A.2d 538; Amira-Jabbar, 726 F. Supp. 2d 77.
173
Blakey, 751 A.2d at 551.
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Cain & O’Brien, supra note 87; see also Gelms, supra note 14, at 275 (arguing that
the standard for whether social media evidence should be considered in a sexual harassment
claim should be based on whether the forum was sufficiently related to the workplace, which
can be determined by whether the employer received a “substantial benefit” from the forum).
175
Gelms, supra note 14, at 275.
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Id. at 271.
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law demonstrates the prudence of monitoring any social networking site that
could reasonably be connected to the workplace, Amira-Jabbar indicates
that doing so will not ensure freedom from liability.
The uncertainty about when liability will arise places the employer even
more on the defensive. As discussed in Part II.A.2., an employer will be
liable for harassment by an employee’s co-worker if the employer knew, or
should have known, of the harassment and did not take prompt and
appropriate action to remedy the situation.177 In the context of social media
harassment, however, whether the employer “should have known” of the
harassment, i.e. that the forum is found to be sufficiently related to the
workplace, is incredibly unclear.178 Therefore, social media sexual
harassment policies must include specific steps employees should take to
inform the employer when they are being sexually harassed online.179 A
clear policy will help ensure that employees make the employer aware of
instances of sexual harassment so that action can be taken.180 Essentially,
the key is enacting a policy that makes employees comfortable coming
forward, so that the employer stays informed and is never left defending why
it should not have known of the conduct.
C. Sexual Harassment Social Media Policies Must be Clear in
Addressing What Constitutes Sexual Harassment on Social Media
Employees must be made aware of what constitutes sexual harassment
on social media not only so that potential perpetrators know when their
conduct rises to the level of sexual harassment, but also so that a victim can
identify harassment when it occurs.181 Despite extensive study and attention
to workplace sexual harassment, not many people can identify sexual
harassment when it occurs.182 The most successful harassment polices
clearly define harassment, explain the options available to a harassment
victim, and describe how the employer will act on a claim of sexual
harassment.183 The position that social media sexual harassment policies
must include procedures for resolving sexual harassment complaints aligns
with the EEOC’s previous guidance that companies’ general sexual
harassment policies should also include appropriate procedures.184
177

See supra Part II.A.2. (citing Enforcement Guidance, supra note 45).
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In Dowd v. United Steelworkers of America, the Eighth Circuit set forth
a definition of harassment that employers can use as a model for defining
online sexual harassment in their policies.185 The court defined unlawful
sexual harassment as “discriminatory intimidation, ridicule or insult that is
sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.”186 First, the court
addressed what discrimination isfor the purposes of this Comment, it is
online sexual harassment defined as sexual intimidation, ridicule, or insult.
Second, and arguably more essential to an employer’s policy, the court stated
that sexual harassment outside the workplace is actionable under Title VII if
severe or pervasive enough that the employee feels the effects of the online
harassment in the workplace.187
Thus, a good policy will make it clear that employees and employers
may be liable for words said online; and that if someone makes sexual
comments online that are likely to produce a negative impact in the
workplace, he or she will be held accountable. Something else that can be
drawn from the distinctionand that should be stated explicitly in a
policyis that liability may arise regardless of who owns the device from
which the harassment is carried out.188
D. The Policy Must Use Language to Avoid Violating Employees’
Rights Under Section 7 of the NLRA
In the context of both company social media policies and company
sexual harassment policies, the Board takes the stance that employers must
refrain from violating employees’ section 7 rights to engage in “concerted
activity.”189 Therefore, when drafting social media sexual harassment
policies, employers must draft policies that avoid “chilling” employees’
section 7 rights.190 As a reminder, section 7 protects an employee’s right to
engage in “concerted activity,” which is defined as discussion between
employees about any terms and conditions of employment, including wages,
hours, union membership, and anything else that could reasonably be
considered for the “mutual aid or protection” of employees.191

harassment,” including sexual harassment, because of the possibility of vicarious liability).
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E. Employers Must Adequately Communicate Policies to Employees
Employers often have trouble adequately communicating both sexual
harassment and social media policies.192 Thus, while this last warning may
seem superfluous, it is apparently very necessary. Effective communication
can be achieved in many ways, including stressing that employees read and
understand the policies, requiring signed policy acknowledgements (which
will also help minimize employer liability if an action does arise), creating
short summaries of policies that employees can easily reference, and even
conducting training sessions designed to recognize and prevent sexual
harassment on social media.193
VI. CONCLUSION
Now that social media is ingrained in our everyday lives, and has
permeated the workplace so thoroughly, workplace harassment has
expanded to social media at a rapid rate. To combat this novel type of
harassment, it is first paramount to educate employers about when they may
be liable for employee sexual harassment and misconduct online, so that their
policies accurately reflect the specific language and actions employees must
avoid. Because the scope of employer liability is so unclear after Blakey and
Amira-Jabbar, employers must encourage employees to come forward with
claims of harassment so that employers are on notice and can address such
claims accordingly. Employers must also enact policies that clearly and
adequately explain what constitutes sexual harassment on social media, use
language that appropriately balances the employers’ interests with
employees’ section 7 rights, and adequately communicate their policies to
their employees so that employees know a policy exists and can become
familiar with its terms. Social media only amplifies the problems of sexual
harassment. Thus, the time has come for employers to fulfill their duty to
minimize workplace sexual harassment by enacting effective social media
sexual harassment policies.

192
Bellstrom, supra note 160 (Jenny Yang, Chair of the EEOC, discussing that many
employers are not communicating their sexual harassment policies well enough to workers—
especially temporary workers); Drouin, O’Connor & Schmidt, supra note 164, at 207 (finding
in a study that 35% of people did not know that their company had a social media policy, and
of the people that did know, 50% did not know what the policy said).
193
Drouin, O’Connor & Schmidt, supra note 164, at 209.

